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Introduction
Initially, it should be pointed out that the present work does not seek 
to analyze the different conceptions and practices of integration in course in 
South America. In the last decade, this theme has been explored by academics 
in a very widespread and consistent way, and today we have a full range of stud-
ies on the subject – which, of course, is still far from being exhausted. However, 
our intention here is to contribute more promptly to the debate, highlighting 
aspects of the geopolitics of the South Atlantic and the oceans in general that 
reinforces the arguments of the so-called revisionist axis of integration.
To do so, we have organized this article in four topics. In the first one, 
we will explore some analyzes on the characteristics of the heterogeneity and 
the fragmentation of the South American integration process. Based on this, 
we will try to locate in which integration point of view are inserted the reflec-
tions that we raise here. In the second topic, we will discuss the most relevant 
phenomena in global geopolitics surrounding oceanic and energy resources 
and their effects on continental policies. In the third one, we will highlight the 
geopolitical factors present in the South Atlantic that impact on the progress of 
regional integration, and point out some potentialities not yet explored. And 
finally, in the fourth topic, we conclude with some reflections on the need for 
the strategic geopolitical element to become a more important variable in the 
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regional agenda.
South American integration and global geopolitics
In order to be more objective in our purpose and not to extend our-
selves in the controversial theme on the types of integration, in this work we 
will take as a basis, the classification suggested by the Venezuelan economist 
José Briceño Ruiz (2013). According to the author, since 2003, the new phase 
of Latin American regionalism is fundamentally characterized by heterogene-
ity and fragmentation. For the academic, there are now three axes of integra-
tion – the open regionalism, the anti-systemic and the revisionist. These axes 
adopt, to a greater or lesser extent, the guidelines of three economic models 
of integration: the neoliberal, the social and the productive. With a bias cen-
tered on free trade, the neoliberal model seeks to integrate the region into 
global markets through trade liberalization and the elimination of barriers 
to the free market. The social model seeks, through cooperation, to coordi-
nate a regional social policy that fosters redistributive policies and diminishes 
the negative social effects produced by open regionalism. And the produc-
tive model sees integration as an instrument of regional development, which 
would materialize with industrialization, the connection of productive chains 
and economic complementarity.
Despite different views, the anti-systemic and revisionist projects do 
not oppose each other adversely in the process of South American integra-
tion. It is even possible to affirm that they exert mutually influences that di-
versify their agendas without overturning their central orientations: ALBA, 
for example, has brought into the Mercosur the social agenda, and has been 
reinforcing in a propositional way the need to seek mechanisms to reduce 
regional economic asymmetries. On the other hand, we clearly note the con-
figuration of an antagonism in the relationship between the strategic and the 
revisionist axis, although the latter does not represent a complete break with 
the commercialist project. Briceño Ruiz (2013, 15), indirectly, also establishes 
this contrast by placing the Pacific Alliance as a project that opposes both 
ALBA and Mercosur:
The Pacific Alliance represents a political response from the Latin Amer-
ican governments that still support the open integration model. It is a re-
action to the growing role of the ALBA axis and the government of Hugo 
Chávez in the scenario of economic integration in Latin America. The new 
block is also intended to be a factor of balance against the growing Brazil-
ian leadership in South America, whether in its unilateral action or in the 
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framework of Mercosur.
At this point, it is interesting to bring to our study a broader view that 
locates South American integration within global geopolitical dynamics and 
does not restrict it to the regional context. The Pacific Alliance, rather than the 
expression of a local variant of integration, embodies the interests of external 
powers that are now at the center of the world power struggle. Although it 
does not represent an effective economic threat to the model of revisionist in-
tegration headed by Brazil, the liberal project of the Pacific divides the region 
and makes it more vulnerable to external pressures, thus reducing its degree 
of autonomy in the process of regionalization and international insertion. In 
other words,
The Pacific Alliance is an instrument of the expansionary struggle for po-
litical and economic influence of great powers and their large transnation-
al corporations in the region, thus allowing greater influence of external 
powers, and greater political weakness and vulnerability to the countries of 
the region. Its weight in economic, population and market terms does not 
challenge Brazil or Mercosur, but the symbology and geopolitical repercus-
sions of such an agreement tend to fracture the region and its possibilities 
of autonomous insertion (Padula 2013, 40).
We cannot disregard the fact that South America is a relevant area 
for external projection of powerful global actors, and that competition on the 
global geopolitical board inevitably resonates in the process of regional inte-
gration. In this light, we assume a critical position in relation to the visions 
that accentuate the autonomous character of the integration process and give 
little importance to the external factors. In other words, we oppose the per-
spective that raises internal factors – such as the lack of consensus among lo-
cal interests, the inability to manage or lack of adequate institutionality – to be 
the sole determinants of regionalization. Without wishing to underestimate 
the relevance of these factors, in this article we will try to move the geopolitical 
element from the position of minor constraint to a prominent place in the 
direction of South American integration.
The external pressure that most strongly influences the integration 
process in South America are the projections of the United States and Chi-
na on the subcontinent. The expansion policies of these powers, as we have 
argued previously, find in the commercial project, now represented by the 
Pacific Alliance, its promotional vehicle. For this reason, we will explore in 
more detail the recent impacts of the US and Chinese international strategies 
on the regional choices of insertion in the world system. Before that, however, 
it is necessary to address some phenomena that are part of the hard core of 
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the competition dynamics for global power hegemony.
Energy and the oceans at the heart of global geopolitics
The current conjuncture of geopolitical changes on the international 
scene indicates that in the coming decades one of the historical trends of the 
capitalist interstate system will become even more intense: the struggle for 
control of areas that are rich in strategic natural resources. According to some 
analysts3, it is now possible to identify two essential and determinant move-
ments in the dynamics of global geopolitics. The first, which has been taking 
place since the second half of the twentieth century, is the adoption, by the 
central countries, of a foreign policy focused especially on the control of areas 
rich in strategic natural resources, making energy security policy the main 
policy determinant. The second movement corresponds to the recent action 
of major powers and some emerging countries to ensure the domination of 
oceanic mining areas. Strategic documents, such as the five-year plans of the 
Chinese State and the US Geological Survey, are important sources of the rise 
of a world deeply interest in seabed resources.
As the American political scientist Michael Klare (2008) points out, 
for more than half a century, the core of global oil production has been mov-
ing from the North to the South, from industrialized to underdeveloped coun-
tries. This change is due to the progressive reduction of energy resources in 
the central countries and to the new opportunities for exploration of offshore 
reserves that recent technological advances in deep water have provided. In 
the last decades, continuous evidence of offshore reserves has mitigated the 
rather negative prediction of the depletion of world oil reserves. However, 
much of the new findings are located in peripheral areas where there is some 
political instability. This fact has generated conflicts and transformations in 
the balance of power of the international system that have important implica-
tions for South America.
In this work, we assume that oil is not losing relevance in the world 
energy matrix. According to Klare (2008), since the 1970s, the United States, 
in parallel to the decline in its oil reserves, has substantially increased its 
military power. With the reduction of production and, at the same time, the 
increase of the demand for oil, the Americans became more dependent on the 
importation of this substance4. The immense US military apparatus, the only 
3  Daniel Yergin, Michael Klare, Philipe Le Billon, Gal Luft, Donna J. Nincic, José Luis Fiori, 
Moniz Bandeira etc.
4  Although the dependency framework of oil imports decreased significantly with the explora-
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truly global one, according to Klare, is practically all fueled by oil. Therefore, 
for the author, the dispute for sources that guarantee the abundant supply of 
this fuel will continue to be the focus of North American foreign policy.
We must also consider that the sharp increase in the demand for oil is 
not only the result of the depletion of reserves and the military strengthening 
of the developed countries. Countries with high economic and demographic 
growth, such as China and India, and countries historically dependent on oil 
imports, such as Japan and Korea, also play a significant role in the global 
competition for energy sources. In addition, Russia, with the recent discover-
ies of oil and gas in Siberia and the Caspian Sea, reappears as an important 
player in the geopolitical game of energy resources. According to British Pe-
troleum (2014), the country maintained the position of the world’s second 
largest oil and gas producer in 2013 (in the first case, slightly behind Saudi 
Arabia, and in the second behind the United States). For Klare (2014),
The continued availability of energy and mineral supplies is also essential 
for political and military survival. No nation can maintain a robust military 
defense without a wide array of modern weapon systems, and most such 
systems—from warships to fighter jets—are fueled by oil. The U.S. mili-
tary, with multiple overseas commitments and a significant combat pres-
ence in Southwest Asia, is especially dependent on petroleum, consuming 
as much oil every day as the entire nation of Sweden. Other nations that 
seek to project military power beyond their immediate territory, such as 
Britain, China, France, and Russia, also require substantial petroleum sup-
plies.
In addition to oil, there are other strategic natural resources of the 
seabed that have attracted the attention of several countries. Many states 
are currently making high investments in deepwater exploration technolo-
gies and exploration, and making great efforts to ensure the right mining of 
iron-manganese crusts (rock formations rich in cobalt and nickel); polymetal-
lic nodules (rich in nickel, cobalt, copper, iron and manganese); and polym-
etallic sulphides (rich in iron, zinc, silver, copper and gold) present in the 
Area5. In the 1960s, interest began to grow in the exploitation of resources 
located in the seabed and in the subsoil of this zone. However, after the 1970s, 
due to the lack of adequate technology and the onshore mining activity still 
showing strong potential, interest in the mining of seabed resources has de-
clined considerably. The ocean bottoms are considered the new frontier of 
tion of huge reserves of shale gas that were discovered recently.
5  The Area corresponds to ocean bottoms that are beyond the limits of any national jurisdic-
tion.
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global mining (Becker 2005), facing a horizon of increasingly evident deple-
tion of the mineral reserves on the mainland and the significant technological 
development in deep waters in several countries.
Minerals in this area have important significance in the development 
agenda of various powers – such as the United States, Germany, China, Rus-
sia and India. The metals found in these reserves can supply the demand 
of strategic industries of important world economies, remembering that this 
demand has been growing substantially due to the intense process of indus-
trialization of countries such as China and India. Copper, cobalt, manganese 
and nickel, for example, are components of great application in various met-
allurgical operations, such as the production of different types of metal al-
loys used in the manufacture of aircraft turbines, marine engines and in the 
automobile and chemical industry. They are also valuable raw materials for 
the production of steel and iron and in manufacturing batteries. In addition, 
Klare (2014)6 emphasizes the importance of these resources for the arms in-
dustry and the war power of nations:
Any nation that seeks to sustain a significant arms-making capability, 
moreover, must possess ensured supplies of iron, cobalt, nickel, titanium, 
and various specialty metals. And, of course, any country seeking to join 
the “nuclear club”—whether for political or for military reasons, or a com-
bination of both—must have a reliable supply of uranium .
The life expectancy of most of the world’s reserves of oil and ores is 
not very promising in the face of the rapid growth of global demand for these 
goods. Therefore, according to Klare (2014), we will see from now on an in-
creasingly fierce dispute over the control of resources located in previously 
unexplored areas – such as some inhospitable African areas and the ocean 
floor:
Virtually all accessible resource zones are now in production; except for 
the extreme areas such as the Arctic, the Congo, the ocean bottom, and 
unyielding rock formations, there is nowhere else to go. For this reason, 
the invasion of the world’s final frontiers has unique significance. What 
we expropriate from these areas represents all that remains of the planet’s 
once abundant resource bounty. In all likelihood, we are looking at the last 
oil fields, the last uranium deposits, the last copper mines, and the last re-
serves of many other vital resources. These materials will not all disappear 
at once, of course, and some as-yet-undeveloped reserves may prove more 
prolific than expected. Gradually, though, we will see the complete disap-
6  Digital book without pagination.
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pearance of many key resources upon which modern industrial civilization 
has long relied .
The search for new energy sources and minerals in remote areas is, 
according to Klare (2014), part of a larger phenomenon of the world geopolit-
ical conjuncture. For the author, what we are witnessing today is a concerted 
maneuver between governments and large corporations to guarantee access 
and control over the remaining raw material reserves in the world.
Donna J. Nincic (2009) points out that most of the world’s most 
promising oil and gas reserves are in maritime territories whose borders have 
not yet been defined. The dispute over control of these areas has inspired 
strong litigation with the relevant international organizations, and has been 
the source of a significant portion of the world’s armed conflicts over energy 
resources:
With the future of energy exploration lying largely in the world’s oceans, 
and with so many known and potential oil and natural gas reserves lying 
in areas with disputed maritime boundaries, conflict over access to these 
resources is bound to continue. The conflicts in the South China Sea and 
elsewhere, and the potential for conflict in the Arctic, show how willing 
nations are to take risks over access to energy resources (Nincic 2009, 41 ).
In this context, the mineral riches present in the South Atlantic have 
been promoting the region, both in economic and strategic terms, as an im-
portant zone for power projection mainly by great world powers.
The South Atlantic and its surroundings in the light of the Si-
no-American competition for natural resources
As we all know, the United States’ ambition for supremacy in the 
American continent is a longstanding one. The intent to play the role of po-
litical arbiter in the region is already signaled in the Federalist Papers, and is 
clearly revealed in the Monroe Doctrine. During World War II, the formula-
tions of Nicholas Spykman pointed to Latin America as an area of strategic 
interest for the United States, where its supremacy could not be questioned 
for security reasons. And, as another example, we can mention how during 
the Cold War, James Burnhan extended this vision by leading the US contain-
ment policy for the region.
To this day, from the point of view of military power, there is no ac-
tor, internal or external, with enough force to challenge the superiority of the 
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United States’ regional projection. However, in the economic sphere, in this 
new millennium, the American ascendancy over the South American coun-
tries begins to show signs of weakening with the notable Chinese expansion 
over the region. In this sense, the almost generalized reaction by South Amer-
ican governments to neoliberalism since the early 2000s has also made a 
significant impact.
During the 1990s, the incorporation of the South American coun-
tries into the neoliberal model took place through the implementation of the 
“Washington Consensus”, a package of economic measures aimed at framing 
the Latin American countries in the process of globalization. The problems of 
the peripheral countries would supposedly be solved through the application 
of measures such as: economic opening, with a strong reduction of protec-
tionist barriers; privatization of state-owned enterprises and public services; 
deregulation of finances, such as the elimination of limits on capital move-
ments; and flexibilization of labor relations, among others. In South America, 
these measures have resulted in de-industrialization, rising unemployment 
and poverty, and deepening external vulnerability. As a result, a great wave 
of opposition to neoliberalism erupted in several countries, which led to the 
rise of new political forces in the continent. Several governments that settled 
at the beginning of the 21st century sought to rescue national projects that 
proposed measures contrary to Washington’s guidelines. It is in this context, 
for example, that the US project to create the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the 
Americas) perished.
The loss of ideological influence over South American governments 
led the United States to adopt, in the 2000s, a generally passive military atti-
tude towards regional issues. However, at the end of the decade, this stance 
began to change. Under the administration of Barack Obama, the US govern-
ment signed a new agreement that gave access to seven air and naval bases in 
Colombian territory; reactivated its Fourth Fleet (U.S. South Atlantic Force); 
intensified naval operations and exercises in the South Atlantic7 etc. Certainly 
such an advantage in the military field is a factor of strong intimidation that 
puts in check the autonomy that the region has over its own destiny. In ad-
dition, it’s important to note the insistent actions by the USA in spreading a 
security agenda based on drug trafficking, through bilateral and OAS actions. 
7   The United States owns large military installations in Ascension Island and two military 
commands to operate in the region: USSOUTHCOM, created in 1963; and AFRICOM, estab-
lished in 2007. The US military power is present in Latin America through the control of bases 
and centers of operations and training. In addition to having Ascension Island and the bases 
where NATO has access in the South Atlantic, they also have fixed supports in various regions 
of the American continent: Guantanamo (Cuba), Honduras, Aruba, Curaçao, El Salvador, Co-
lombia, Chile, Peru, Guyana and Suriname.
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In the economic area, however, the story is a different one. Today, 
South America is configured as an important area of contention, where the 
dominance of the United States begins to decline due to the rise of the Chi-
nese presence. The confrontation between these two powers, already so ev-
ident in the countries bordering the Pacific, was not restricted to this side 
of the South Atlantic: Chinese and Americans have also been competing to 
expand their power of influence over African countries on the Atlantic coast.
Until the mid-twentieth century, the United States paid little attention 
to the African side of the South Atlantic. Throughout the century, this picture 
began to change because of Soviet intervention and the process of decoloniza-
tion in Africa. But closer trade ties with the West African fraction are a more 
recent phenomenon. In recent decades, there has been a substantial increase 
in the share of energy minerals in the United States import tariff. Today, An-
gola and Nigeria appear in the analysis of the EIA (2014) in 5th and 10th place, 
respectively, as suppliers of crude oil to the United States.
In the last decade, similarly to what happened in South America, 
there has also been a significant increase in the Chinese presence in Africa, 
as evidenced by the dramatic increase in trade and investment figures on the 
continent. In the span of ten years, between 2002 and 2012, Chinese imports 
from Africa went from approximately $ 500 million to $ 14 billion; this means 
a gross increase of more than 2000%. In 2002, China, which accounted for 
only 1% of total African exports, came to represent 6.6% in 2012. Along with 
oil, mineral resources are the African products that occupy the most promi-
nence in the Chinese import tariff. Recalling that, in addition to the gigantic 
land reserves, there are significant deposits of offshore minerals, not counting 
the resources of the Area8. It is worth remembering that China – along with 
Japan, the United States and Germany – is among the countries that have the 
most advanced technology for research and exploitation of these resources.
China’s demand for base minerals has grown more than 10 percent 
a year since 1990. Today, China is the world’s largest consumer of alumi-
num, iron ore, lead and zinc, as well as considerable stakes in the demand 
for other minerals. As a reflex, China’s imports of non-combustible mineral 
resources from African countries off the Atlantic coast have increased sig-
nificantly in the last decades. South Africa accounts for the largest share of 
Chinese imports (5.5%). More than 80% of the cobalt imported by China and 
8  Considering that the extension of Africa’s continental shelf is a narrow one – and therefore 
the abyssal regions are relatively close to the coast –, it is probable that the mineral riches of the 
Area are closer to the African Atlantic coast. In addition, the Meso-Atlantic Ridge – an under-
water mountainous chain where polymetallic sulphides have already been found – is located in 
a shorter distance from the African coast when compared to the American coast.
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40% of the manganese comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Gabon, respectively. It is worth mentioning that China is the destination of 
about 62% of the export of minerals from South Africa and 95% from Nigeria 
(UN Comtrade). The increased intensity of recent flows illustrates the strong 
complementarity between African natural resources and the Chinese econo-
my. As Fiori puts it (2014, 251), “Africa is today the great space of primitive 
Asian accumulation and one of the main frontiers of economic and political 
expansion for China and India.” It is worth noting that China has no military 
presence in the region, but only commercial relations of military assets.
Turning to the maritime landscape, the growing importance of oil 
and gas in the world economy gives special emphasis to the recent oil dis-
coveries on the coast of the countries bathed by the South Atlantic. In Brazil, 
since 2001, the new reserves that were found, including pre-salt, increased 
national reserves by approximately 67% and enabled Brazil to increase its oil 
production by 60%. Today, Brazil holds the 13th position in the ranking of 
oil producing countries (BP 2014). On this side of the South Atlantic, aside 
from Brazil, new reserves were also found on the Argentine continental shelf, 
which cover the Malvinas Islands and the Antarctic zone in dispute with Eng-
land.
Approximately 1.1% of the world’s proved oil reserves and 0.4% of the 
gas reserves are found in the South American Atlantic coast. These figures 
may not be very expressive in the world scenario, but it is necessary to con-
sider the great unexplored potential of the enormous reserve of the “pre-salt”, 
and probably of the continental shelf. In addition, if we add to the Atlantic 
countries the oil and gas reserves of the other South American countries, the 
percentage of world reserves is close to 18% for oil and 3.5% for gas. On the 
African Atlantic coast, Angola and Nigeria stand out among the continent’s 
top five oil producers and account for more than half of African production 
(EIA 2011). It’s also in these countries where statistics indicate the largest 
growth of oil deposits in the last twenty years. Proven Angolan reserves in-
creased by almost 5-fold from 2 billion barrels in 1990 to 9 billion in 2014. 
Meanwhile, Nigerian reserves more than doubled, rising from 16 billion to 
37 billion barrels in the same years. Today, Angola occupies the 16th place in 
the world ranking of oil production, and Nigeria the 12th place (BP 2014). It 
is worth mentioning that recent significant offshore reserves have also been 
found in other countries of the Gulf of Guinea.
In addition to oil, the South Atlantic is endowed with mineral resourc-
es present in the area. Despite the scarcity of studies on the South Atlantic 
seabed, resources of high economic and strategic value such as iron-manga-
nese crusts, nodules and polymetallic sulphides were found. The most prom-
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ising deposits of the three mineral compounds mentioned are located in the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans. This is mainly due to the existence of greater in-
vestments in research in this region. However, the research already carried 
out indicates the presence of polymetallic nodules in the ocean basins around 
Trindade Island; of iron-manganese crusts at the Rio Grande elevation; and of 
polymetallic sulphides near the São Pedro and São Paulo archipelago.
Inasmuch as the importance of the resources of the South Atlantic 
and its surrounding continental regions is underlined, we wish to highlight 
some specific aspects of the most recent external projections in South Amer-
ica, especially in China, which may be decisive in the course of regional inte-
gration.
The South Atlantic: development and regional integration
As is well known, for the Chinese, the continuity of the country’s 
growth, the fulfillment of its development goals and the guarantee of the mo-
bility of its military power depend, inexorably, on the guarantee of safe ac-
cess to energy resources. China sees energy shortages as one of its greatest 
potential threats. The substantial increase in dependence on oil imports has 
demanded the Chinese government to restructure its energy security strategy. 
According to Klare (2008, 75), since China began to import oil, it is possible 
to perceive three priority orientations in its energy security policy: 1) to di-
versify sources of imported energy supply; (2) to expand supply possibilities 
by land and reduce reliance on oil transported by sea; 3) and to delegate the 
acquisition of foreign energy supplies to state-owned enterprises.
Regarding the economic intentions of the Chinese projection in 
South America, there are two main motivations: facilitated access to strategic 
natural resources, and market expansion for its higher added value products. 
According to Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2012), 
China’s foreign economic policy (like American policy) has as its main 
objective to ensure access to sources of mineral, energy and agricultural 
raw materials throughout the world, but, as it should be, especially in the 
peripheral world of Africa and Latin America. This demand, which will 
continue to exist in a large scale, even if there is a growing emphasis on the 
development of its domestic market, has a direct impact on the economy of 
Mercosur as a whole and for each state-party, especially for Brazil.
And, indeed, the numbers that attest to the extraordinary growth 
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of China’s share of South American trade and investment9 are proof of the 
strength of its expansion in the subcontinent. However, it is also necessary to 
look at other possible effects of China’s foreign policy and energy security and 
the global energy dispute. Considering that the majority of the investments 
destined to South America are related to the sector of energy and metals, with-
out difficulty, we can locate the extension of the projection of Chinese capital 
in South America in the first guideline mentioned by Klare. However, we 
would like to draw attention to some possible effects of the Chinese actions 
dedicated to fulfilling its second orientation.
In order to extend its energy supply protection margin China has 
sought to reduce its dependence on energy supplies transported by sea. Ac-
cording to Comtrade (2013), more than 40% of Chinese oil imports come 
from the Middle East. This cargo crosses the Strait of Hormuz and passes 
through the Straits of Malacca, until reaching the eastern Chinese coast. This 
is one of the most important oil trade routes and is controlled by the Ameri-
cans. As a safety measure, China has been pushing ahead with a number of 
projects with neighboring countries to build pipelines and gas pipelines that 
could divert part of the oil circulation to land routes and facilitate their access 
to the world’s energy and mineral resources.
In our view, it is following the aforementioned strategic line that Chi-
na has given special attention to the bi-oceanic corridor construction projects 
in South America. Such projects, as early as the 2000s, comprised the infra-
structure portfolio of the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infra-
structure of South America (IIRSA). This body was created with the objective 
of promoting the expansion of a transport infrastructure that supported the 
formation of a regional free trade area. That is, the corridors were conceived 
within the logic of the neoliberal model of integration of open regionalism, 
which, as Padula (2014, 14) explains, proposes to be:
A model whereby, in a peaceful way through the opening of markets, the 
South American countries would facilitate access to the natural resources 
of the region to transnational corporations and their sponsoring mother 
states, through trade and investment flows, not only in productive explor-
atory activities, but also in the logistics construction of export corridors.
As already discussed in the beginning of this article, in the 2000s, the 
new elected governments in Latin America, refuting the neoliberal project, 
undertook a series of actions with the purpose of revising the model of open 
9  In 2002, China accounted for only 4.3% of total South American exports; already in 2012, it 
now represents over 15% (Comtrade 2013).
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regional integration. In this context, in 2008, UNASUR emerged, and, in 
2009, subordinated to it, the Infrastructure and Planning Council (Cosiplan) 
was created, conceived to function as an executive body of IIRSA. This was to 
ensure that IIRSA followed the guidelines dictated by the UNASUR govern-
ments. These were aimed at building a regional physical integration structure 
that would foster internal development and enable the connection of produc-
tive chains with higher added value in the region. Thus, bi-oceanic corridors 
can make possible different integration plans, including antagonistic projects 
such as “open regionalism” and “revisionist”. According to consultants10 of 
the Center for Management and Strategic Studies (CGEE 2013, 66):
After all, what role can the construction of transport routes and bi-ocean-
ic connections have in the process of regional integration? They can act 
as much in favor of the socioeconomic development, strategic autonomy 
and political dominion of the geographical spaces of the continent by the 
countries of the region, as well as efficiently articulate the strategic natural 
resources of the region to the international market, attending to the in-
terests of internationalization of resources for powers and multinational 
companies. (...) Such corridors can act as corridors for the export of natural 
resources and low-value goods, and as corridors for the importation of in-
dustrial goods of higher added value and technological intensity of other 
countries and continents. Also, they can serve for the political penetration 
by actors outside the region, seeking to access, influence and control terri-
tories and strategic resources of the countries of the region.
China’s great interest in bi-oceanic corridors is not just a strategy to 
secure future energy and mineral supplies from South America.
There are those who argue that “bi-oceanic” is not the appropriate 
term for South American projects, since they do not have as main objective 
to use the subcontinent as an enabler of the continuity of a flow of commerce 
between two oceans11 . In fact, today, there is no such strong maritime trade in 
the southern hemisphere as to justify the need to deploy such transportation 
corridors. As we have already pointed out, such avenues of communication 
are designed to optimize the flow of production (mostly primary products) to 
international markets, especially to Asia12 and the United States, which con-
10   Chapter written by José Luis Fiori, Maria Claudia Vater and Raphael Padula.
11  Authors from different areas (international law, engineering, military, etc.) that signal the 
lack of an adequate definition for these routes. Among them, the captain Dilermando Ribeiro 
Lima, Marianela Salazar Vega, among others.
12  This focus is made evident in documents and studies promoted by the governments of the 
region. To cite an example, the technical report "Evaluation of bioceanic corridors", made by 
the BNDES, makes explicit that the estimation of the commercial flow potential that would 
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centrate most of their activities in the Pacific coast.
However, the data presented in the previous topic provide us with in-
dications that there may be a greater interest in the attraction of China by the 
future South American corridors than just facilitating access to commodities 
in the region. First, in addition to the natural resources of South America, the 
energy and mineral riches of Atlantic Africa and the South Atlantic have also 
taken a prominent place in the economic expansion projects of the United 
States and China. Thus, through bi-oceanic corridors, there would also be po-
tential for the circulation of goods from these areas. Second, China’s actions 
in the subcontinent may be part of a larger strategy, which involves other 
guidelines of its foreign policy. As we have already mentioned, the search for 
alternative routes for the movement of strategic goods is at the heart of Chi-
na’s energy security policy, and a land route connecting the South Atlantic and 
the Pacific can be very convenient.
That is, for China, besides the gains from trade, the increase of its 
presence in South America also involves a question of geostrategic order. In 
our view, this perception can broaden our prospect on the meanings of the 
regional integration process. Relations with China have been a way out for 
South American countries to bypass the effects of the 2008 crisis. However, 
as far as the regionalization progress is concerned, if we remain tied to a 
short-term perspective, we will not be able to see in China opportunities more 
advantageous compared to those we can get with the United States or other 
powers. Restricted to commercialism, few possibilities can be seen beyond 
expanding our condition as a primary exporting region. According to Fiori 
(2014, 259), 
After the crisis of 2008, (...) South America briefly recovered from Chinese 
growth, but this short-term success has brought back, and deepened, some 
secular features of the South American economy that have almost always 
hindered and hampered the integration project, namely, the fact that it is 
a sum of primary-exporting economies oriented towards external markets.
Nevertheless, this is not a compulsory route. Ambassador Samuel 
Pinheiro Guimarães (2012), analyzing the impacts of the Chinese factor in 
Mercosur, has argued that the scenario, commercially favorable to the coun-
tries of South America, should be exploited in favor of the industrial and tech-
nological development of the region. 
pass through the corridors takes into account only the import and export data of the South 
American countries: “It should be noted that the approach taken to estimate the potential de-
mand in the simulation model considers all flows with origin or destination in South America” 
(BNDES 2010, 220).
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The crisis of the world economy, which will last for at least another decade, 
and the greater freedom of economic policies in the external area, due to 
the weakening of the neoliberal practices that provoked it, and the protec-
tionist actions of the developed countries, enables the Mercosur countries 
to take advantage of this rare opportunity in the course of its history: to 
make use of the extraordinary Chinese demand for primary products in 
order to promote its development, that is, of its industrial development. 
Thus, together with a strategic transformation of Mercosur, it would be ex-
tremely important to conclude trade and industry agreements with China 
for the industrial processing of raw materials (...). This alternative would be 
in perfect harmony with the objective of the development of the economy, 
which is the capacity to transform its natural resources, to add value to 
production, to create better paid jobs, to raise its technological level, and to 
vertically integrate sectors of its economies.
In the following section, the economist Carlos Medeiros (2010) high-
lights some structural aspects of Mercosur that impede regional productive 
integration, among them, the concentration of trade in primary commodities 
and natural resources. The author points out that the effort dedicated to devel-
oping industry and infrastructure in the region would contribute to diversify 
the exports of the smaller economies, thus enabling a greater regional com-
plementation:
The predominance of primary commodities and natural resource-intensive 
activities, deregulation and financial vulnerability, the backwardness of the 
electrical and electronic machinery industries, the lack of specialized OEM 
equipment, the predominance of subsidiaries of multinational companies 
based outside the region, the absence of a gradient of technological content 
coupled with the cost of labor between countries, and the high costs of 
transport are evident macro-structural explanations. However, in spite of 
these factors, there was in some industrial segments a growing intra-in-
dustry trade, signaling an important possibility of deepening productive 
integration and sector diversification. This geographic internalization of 
the benefits of integration depends, however, on the degree to which the 
expansion of the Brazilian economy’s market allows a combination of in-
dustrial and infrastructure investment initiatives to favor the diversification 
of exports from the least developed countries, making the expansion of the 
regional bloc’s trade flow a simultaneous way of achieving greater external 
sustainability for the economies (Medeiros 2010, 27).
Final considerations: South Atlantic as opportunities x risks
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The economically viable natural resources and geostrategic potential 
of the South Atlantic can be important catalysts for industrialization and pro-
ductive integration. There is a potential for exploiting such resources that in-
volve more dynamic industrial sectors (of higher added-value products with 
high technological content) that could be included in the agenda of negoti-
ations with China. In recent years, the Chinese have invested heavily in the 
development of technologies for offshore use and, like Brazil, are among the 
few countries qualified to conduct exploration activities in the area.
It may be pointed out that the energy and mineral wealth of the South 
Atlantic represents only a future opportunity to significantly increase the re-
serves of exportable primary goods. In this way, these resources would end 
up stimulating the region’s primary-export specialization and thus would not 
contribute to industrialization, so necessary for the advancement of the pro-
ductive integration process. Arguing in favor  of the idea that we can extract 
other opportunities of the activities implied in the defense and exploitation of 
the resources of the South Atlantic, below we selected another fragment from 
a study realized by the Center of Management and Strategic Studies (2013, 
129):
State commissions and support ensure that the defense sector can be a 
good business and generate its own (national) technologies and production 
in this sensitive and strategic sector. Amazônia Azul Defense Technolo-
gies (Amazul), created in 2012 and linked to the Ministry of Defense, and 
the South American Defense Council, can articulate, respectively, a Brazil-
ian and South American defense industrial base. A policy of demanding a 
greater participation of national content, or of South American companies, 
in the orders contracted with foreign companies, can initially drive impor-
tant changes (CGEE 2013, 129).
In 2014, Petrobras was awarded, for the third time13, for the develop-
ment of offshore oil exploration technologies. Today, the company is an inter-
national reference in the area and considered the world leader in this sector. 
This segment is the main engine of the Brazilian naval industry, which has 
been gaining a strong boost in recent years.
The defense of the South Atlantic waters and the mining of offshore 
resources require intense efforts by the naval industry and require major in-
vestments in the development of technologies for deepwater exploration. In 
our view, the possible convergence between Brazil and China in relation to 
ocean resources should not be understood only as a beneficial opportunity 
13  With the OTC Distinguished Achievement Award for Companies, Organizations, and In-
stitutions.
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for Brazilian growth. Industrial areas driven by possible cooperation in this 
segment with China should be seen by the South American countries as a 
whole, and especially by Brazil, as possibilities to strengthen the productive 
integration of the region.
In addition to different forms of economic exploitation, there is a po-
litical aspect of great importance that must be carefully considered: South 
Atlantic resources can also contribute to the promotion of a common security 
agenda for South America. With a focus on sovereignty over natural resources 
and in defense of external threats, this agenda would be an alternative to the 
US hemispheric agenda, disseminated through the OAS and bilateral agree-
ments aimed at combating drug trafficking. In this sense, Brazil has been 
fomenting regional initiatives through the Defense Council of UNASUR.
The South Atlantic represents development opportunities for South 
America, but for this to become a reality, the states of the region, including 
Brazil, must partially abdicate the benefits that can be obtained in the short 
term with the expansion of trade, and highlight, in a more consistent way, a 
strategic geopolitical vision within the regional integration project.
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ABSTRACT
In light of the recent deceleration and disarticulation of the South American 
integration process, the objective of this paper is to highlight some geopolitical factors 
in the South Atlantic Ocean, which, in our view, should set and propel a strategy 
of rapprochement of the different interests in the subcontinent and contribute to 
greater convergence in the integration agenda. 
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